We will continue onward with evidence to the truth that the Terrorist Adil Charkaoui fomented Islamic ‘Judicial Jihad” to try to eradicate the use of Security Certificates. He used every measure he could to disrupt the ability of CSIS to monitor him and the RCMP to police him.
We shall examine the three areas of concern raised by Justice Noel in Series – 2.
A Man of Deception Before and After His Detention Through Security Certificate
Deception has been a major factor of this mans life in its entirety. We shall be doing a synopsis of some salient events that took place showing Charkaoui uses religious studies and pursuit of education as a pretext for conducting his terrorist activities. Such was the case during the time of 1992 to 1995, when under pretext of travel for religious studies he went to Morocco where he met the French teacher, who became his wife.
Movement was easy for Charkaoui through using an alias in his travels, but his identification transgressions were red flagged as they became apparent to CSIS and the RCMP. During his trip to Pakistan from February to July of 1998 he crossed into Afghanistan under the name of Zubeir Al-Maghrebi and was identified as being there at an Al-Qaeda training camp by Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida.
In such out of country forays he employed forged identification easily attained through such document forgers as Karim Said Atmani who shared a Montreal apartment with > Ahmed Ressam and was > Fateh Kamel‘s “right hand man”. Adil Charkaoui knew and had contacts with this man.
A second source for his forged documents was Abdellah Ouzghar: According to Canadian Immigration Reports in May 11, 2010 the jihadi Ouzghar has been convicted of supplying false passports to terrorists. He was also recorded as promoting jihad at mosque prayer sessions frequented by Adil Charkaoui. Our terrorist is on record stating he came to know Abdellah Ouzghar. In another Series Item you will see ‘Adil’s Bad Boys List’ with expanded information surrounding these forgers Atmani and Ouzghar.
PIZZA and PAKISTAN
It was from 2001 to 2003, that Charkaoui operated a Montreal pizzeria, and where the > CSIS first approached him in the wake of 9/11. He refused to account for his whereabouts or reason for travel to Pakistan. But Moroccan authorities have stated that Charkaoui provided funds and resources to an Islamic insurgent group and linked him to terrorist entities in Pakistan.
When arrested under the security certificate in 2003, Charkaoui immediately began a legal battle to avoid deportation. He fought to eliminate Security Certificates in every manner he could devise over a period of some six years. During this time of numerous court hearings, the judges continued to back up Ottawa’s core contentions that Charkaoui remained a threat to national security and that the security-certificate law was fundamentally sound.
But, as is to be witnessed, a sequence of events ultimately left Charkaoui free to carry on his jihad designs and the legal system surrounding policing of terrorism somewhat disheveled. In arriving at such a juncture, we see one of the major concerns about Charkaoui was his lack of accountability for the trip he made to Pakistan, which I shall highlight a bit later.
But first we see on Jan. 23, 2004, that among other things > Charkaoui’s loses another bid for release under bail. (2004-01-23 / 2004 FC 107 / DES-3-03)
Note: The review of former docket evidence at this time shows that while avoiding answering to the concerns initially raised by the Court, Charkaoui is still asking that he be released irrespective of the danger that the Ministers associated with his person.
“The respondent, through his counsel, asked that I release him on conditions and bail. Since I have reached the conclusion that the danger still remains, which in itself is just cause, I need not contemplate this possibility at this stage of the proceedings. The danger remains and it is not a conditional release and bail that will eliminate this danger at this time. (Charkaoui, July 15, 2003, paragraph 66)
On January 12, 2004, at the second review of the continued detention, Mr. Charkaoui filed ten affidavits, some of which included documentation (specifically, some newspaper articles discussing the reliability and credibility of Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida, two persons who identified Mr. Charkaoui as an individual they had met in Afghanistan in 1998 in a training camp of the al-Qaeda movement and whom they knew under the name of “Zubeir Al Maghrebi”).
All of the affidavits submitted by Mr. Charkaoui have in common the fact that each of the affiants offers a monetary contribution toward bail for his conditional release (totaling $25,000 on the first review and $50,000 on this one). Should he be released from detention on bail, some of these affiants explain, they will supervise Mr. Charkaoui to ensure that he complies with the conditions of his release.
However, I note that some four of the ten affiants do not know Mr. Charkaoui and that five of these ten affiants have previously signed affidavits or testified during the first review.
These affidavits do not address any of the three concerns (mentioned in paragraph 5 of this judgment) that could enlighten the Court concerning the danger that Mr. Charkaoui might constitute to national security or to the safety of any person, or the risk that he might fail to appear at a proceeding.”
Take note: The key persons who would supervise Adil Charkaoui to ensure that he complies with the conditions of his proposed release are the immediate members of his own family. His father is the same person that raised him to be the threat he represents. How can one rationally expect that you can rely upon an older rabid pit bull to guard you from being bitten by a younger ‘more agile’ pit bull?
Also notice ‘that some newspaper articles discussing the reliability and credibility of Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida’ were entered in through the Charkaoui affidavits.
“Mr. Charkaoui alleges that under Division 6 of the IRPA and sections 244 et seq. of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), the judge must consider release (albeit on bail and subject to stringent conditions) with a view to neutralizing the risk of danger to the greatest possible degree.
On a review of detention, section 85 of the IRPA stipulates that sections 82 to 84 prevail over the provisions of Division 6. Subsection 83(3) of the IRPA and is clear: the person concerned shall remain in detention if there is evidence that he continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any person or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.
Considering the additional evidence adduced on January 12, 2004, I am of the opinion that the danger must be assessed and that conditional release cannot be contemplated unless there is sufficient evidence that the danger is reduced or does not exist, and that Mr. Charkaoui will continue to submit to the proceeding.
The explanation of the Court of Appeal applies equally on a review of detention under subsections 83(2) and 83(3) of the IRPA, when assessing whether there is a danger or not and the possibility of a conditional release on bail.
In order to facilitate the task for Mr. Charkaoui, I indicated in Charkaoui, July 15, 2003 the Court’s concerns about the danger to national security. However, the additional evidence presented to the Court does not address these concerns and essentially includes an increase in the amount of the bail, an undertaking by some affiants to ensure that Mr. Charkaoui complies with the conditions of release, and a questioning of the reliability of the information communicated to the Ministers by Mr. Ressam and Mr. Zubaida.
Mr. Charkaoui’s counsel explained the decision not to adduce evidence pertaining to these concerns; such evidence, they said, would go to the very substance of the litigation, i.e. would affect the issue of the reasonableness of the certificate, and should not be presented at the stage of a review of the detention. They also argued that there had been an appeal of Charkaoui, July 15, 2003, and since the appeal was dismissed (on the ground that there is no appeal from a decision concerning detention), an application for leave had been submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Take note: They have already lost an appeal for release under bail but are repeating the request for release because the bail was denied, and thus it should now take place with a view to neutralizing the risk of danger to the greatest possible degree as stipulated by Charkaoui. Judge Noel politely but effectively commented on the stupidity of such tact. But, it did serve to keep the Charkaoui hunt for means to destroy security certificates front and center.
“Given the presumption of validity of legislation, the scope of the allegations and the importance to Mr. Charkaoui of regaining his freedom, I am surprised at this approach. The danger to national security cannot be assessed in a factual vacuum. By avoiding an answer to the concerns raised by the Court, Mr. Charkaoui is asking that he be released irrespective of the danger that the Ministers associate with his person. When the issue is one of national security or the safety of Canadians, the designated judge has a duty to assess the danger that is posed by a person concerned in light of all the available evidence.
In the case at bar, this task involves assessing, pursuant to subsection 83(3) of the IRPA, whether the person concerned still constitutes a danger to national security or to the safety of any person or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal. No decision to release on bail and subject to conditions can be made without answering the allegations of the Ministers that the person concerned is a danger.
In light of the evidence presented by both parties, and even if I were to consider such conditions for Mr. Charkaoui’s release as surrender of a passport, curfews, predetermined meetings, restrictions on his personal relations, a monitor indicating his whereabouts, etc., it is not my opinion at this point that these measures would be adequate to neutralize the danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or the unlikelihood that he would appear at a proceeding or for removal.
I note that this case pertains to immigration law and not the area of criminal law. The appropriate approach, when the Ministers present serious evidence that the person concerned is a danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or that he is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal, is to adduce any possible evidence that would allow the Court to question the Ministers’ conclusion. I am unable, from the evidence adduced, to reach any conclusion other than that Mr. Charkaoui still constitutes a danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or that he is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.
As to the disposition as to costs, Mr. Charkaoui’s counsel has asked that I postpone it to a later date. So, I am giving the parties ten days following the receipt of this decision to make their submissions to me on this matter, failing which there will be no award as to costs.
The COURT Orders That Mr. Charkaoui’s Detention Be Continued, in accordance with subsection 83(3) of the IRPA until the designated judge again rules in regard to the continuation of the detention.”
Take note: That within three months, on April 28, 2004 (2004-04-28 / 2004 FC 624 / DES-3-03) Charkaoui was trying to have Justice Noel removed on the basis of being biased. This all is tabled for discussion when we get fully into the matters surrounding his ‘problematic trip to Pakistan’. This will be after we present Series-4 and The Respondent’s Life in Canada.
I know for a certitude that the sooner The Respondent’s Life in Canada comes to an absolute termination the better it shall be for our Nation.
Galatians 4:16 Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?
Only if you are a Muslim jihadist.