The list of Bad Boys gave a good idea of the characters that surrounded Charkaoui in his day-to-day jihadi activities in Canada and externally. We shall now continue tracking him down.



The Respondent’s Trip to Pakistan from February to July of 1998

 Adil Charkaoui, is a Morocco-born Canadian citizen who was arrested by the Canadian government under a security certificate in May 2003.

Before issuing the certificate, evidence was submitted that he had trained in an anti-Soviet Jihadist camp in Afghanistan. The court was also not satisfied with his reasons for visiting Pakistan for six months in 1990. Evidence that he practiced karate was also among the submissions. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) testimonies included opinions that he would also “have been trained in such areas as: operating rocket-propelled grenade-launchers, sabotage, urban and assassination.” CSIS also alleged that ” it was noteworthy that one of those who participated in the hijacking of the September 11 attacks in 2001 had taken martial arts training in preparation…” and suggested that Charkaoui represented a sleeper agent.  This led to the issuance of the security certificate by the two responsible government ministers after which he was detained, and such evidence was also enough to uphold the certificate by Federal Court upon review.

I remind you that this trip of concern was a precursor to his claim of being branded a thief due to lack of cash for a legal defence.

Along with CSIS, Justice Noel was very concerned about the secrecy and lack of information that Charkaoui provided surrounding his trip to Pakistan. Justice Noel states: “It seems to me that for the purpose of clarifying this stay of close to six months in Pakistan, the respondent could have had recourse to his passport, his professors, the University or institution where he studied the Muslim religion, etc. But nothing was done in this regard. Although a witness stated that he was satisfied with the respondent’s explanations, I am not. The respondent would have everything to gain from explaining this trip in detail.”

Charkaoui gave investigators nothing, no format of a reasonable explanation and offered nothing for consideration by the Court under Noel. But, both his father and his wife claimed the trip was to study the Muslim religion as part of a project to write a book on the Muslim religion in French.

However, entered into evidence: “During a CSIS interview with the respondent on February 27, 2001, it was noted that:

Charkaoui said he had been sponsored to go and take a five-month course in religions in 1998. According to the subject, this religion course is divided into a number of components: course on the Koran; course on Islamic culture; course on the customs of the Koran.

Charkaoui said that this five-month course was very beneficial to him and this deepening of the Muslim religion enabled him to answer a number of existential questions.

However, Charkaoui himself indicated that he had had some bad experiences during this stay in Pakistan in 1998. The subject indicated that once his course in religion had ended, he was arrested twice within the territorial limits of Pakistan. (See Tab 4, Volume B, Record of documentation concerning Adil Charkaoui)

 From 2001 to 2003, Charkaoui operated a Montreal pizzeria, where the CSIS first approached him in the wake of 9/11. He refused to account for his whereabouts or reason for travel to Pakistan. However, Moroccan authorities had stated that Charkaoui provided funds and resources to an Islamic insurgent group.

 In another meeting, on July 26, 2002, the CSIS investigators noted that: … Charkaoui denied being in Afghanistan and having made the Jihad there. He confirmed he had been in Pakistan to do some studies in the Islamic religion in several cities of Pakistan, primarily in Karachi. He noted that he had attended some madrassas in that country. (See Tab 3, Volume B, Record of documentation concerning Adil Charkaoui)

But at the time of Justice Noel first investigating the event of his Pakistan-Afghanistan sojourn even his brother in law Larbi Ouazzani, the first person to testify in favor of the respondent, was raising doubts about the reasons for the supposed trip for religious studies.

As is stated by Noel: “Mr. Ouazzani asked the respondent the purpose of his trip to Pakistan. It seems to me that Mr. Ouazzani was concerned by the fact that he did not know the respondent had made a trip to Pakistan and wondered about the reason for such a trip.

As a result of the media coverage of this case, this trip aroused some concerns in Mr. Ouazzani, a witness for the respondent: “Were you concerned about that trip?”

Yes, it was a matter of concern to me. I wanted to know, it worried meIn other circumstances, it would be no more suspicious to travel to Pakistan than to the United States. But when you put this whole story in its context, you can’t help being suspicious. And when you also put the thing in what I have just explained to you, it becomes comprehensible. Do you understand, My Lord?”

Take note: And do you understand who the man Charkaoui is from the Series evidence so far? You see, it is incomprehensible that an intimate Muslim male family member would not have been included in discussing the plans for such a momentous religious studies trip if not for the existent mindset of Charkaoui by this time. He had for some time walked in the reality of the true ‘cell group jihadi’- no information to anyone without absolute need to know surrounding any ‘assignment’. No relationship of any kind superseded that of the brotherhood of cell group design of the mujahedeen.

Adil was simply on-the-job and Ouazzani should have had no expressed concern if he truly comprehended the demands of sharia. However, Ouazzani also stated he was ultimately satisfied with the explanation Adil provided for the events surrounding the trip.  But as Noel stated: “Although a witness stated that he was satisfied with the respondent’s explanations, I am not. The respondent would have everything to gain from explaining this trip in detail.”

There is more to come from external sources, but perhaps the most damning associate evidence of the true nature of Adil Charkaoui is that given by his father. “Mr. Mohamed Charkaoui, states in his affidavit that he raised his son in accordance with the precepts of their religion.” And the precepts of their religion demand the eradication through every means possible of all that oppose sharia. Case closed you foolish kafirs.

Now, to reiterateCharkaoui was arrested under a security certificate in May 2003, which was co-signed by Solicitor General Wayne Easter, and Immigration Minister Denis Coderre. He was detained without charge or trial in Rivière des prairies Detention Centre. The Coalition Justice for Adil Charkaoui was formed in defense of his rights, with Coalition launching a campaign for his release.

He was released from prison on $50,000 bail on 18 February 2005. His bail conditions included a curfew, electronic monitoring, designated chaperones for leaving his home, restriction to the island of Montreal, 24-hour police access to his home without warrant, and a prohibition on access to the internet, on the use of cell phones and on the use of any telephone except the one in his home.

Restrictions on his conditional release were gradually lifted to be cancelled in September 2009. On his final release order by Federal Court Judge Danièle Lame Brain Tremblay-Lamer it is stated “There will be an order all conditions be revoked immediately.”

And with this Adil was uncuffed. This man went on to found Anti-Islamaphobiain 2013 with Canadian tax payers’ dollars after release and he still belonged in jail until extradited or deported permanent from the nation.


Evidence introduced at the sequence of docket hearings following shows the purposes of Adil Charkaoui’s trips.  In his zest to find means to eradicate security certificates Charkaoui opened a doorway that necessitated two more ‘sittings’ by Justice Noel that allowed entry to public knowledge of previously classified information.

On July 26, 2002, the CSIS investigators noted that Charkaoui denied being in Afghanistan and having made the Jihad there which are proven absolute lies when April 28, 2004: > Charkaoui loses his bid to remove judge Noel for being biased. (2004 FC 624 – DES-3-03)

We see in docket information at this time that Charkaoui was being considered an even greater security threat than prior for his bail surety was doubled for a number of reasons surrounding Justice Noel’s original three concerns.

“To facilitate Mr. Charkaoui’s task, I identified three concerns, namely his life from 1992 to 1995 in Morocco and from 1995 to 2000 in Canada, including travel; Mr. Charkaoui’s trip to Pakistan from February to July 1998; and Mr. Charkaoui’s contacts with Abousfiane Abdelrazik, Samir Ait Mohamed, Karim Saïd Atmani, Raouf Hannachi and Abdellah Ouzghar. Based on the evidence presented by both parties in this matter, I consider these three concerns are important to a responsible assessment of the danger and of the public interest. In the interest of justice and to resolve these concerns, I invited Mr. Charkaoui to submit evidence that might challenge the evidence submitted by the Ministers and enable him to recover his liberty.

In the subsequent decision of February 4, 2004, on continuing the detention, I noted that Mr. Charkaoui had not dealt with these three concerns. However, the evidence he presented added to that of the first review, by increasing the surety from $25,000 to $50,000; filing newspaper articles dealing with the unreliability, and questioning the credibility, of Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida, two individuals who identified Mr. Charkaoui as a person they had met in an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 1998, and whom they knew as “Zubeir Al-Maghrebi”; and by filing affidavits supporting his application for release. Mr. Charkaoui argued that in reviewing the continued detention, a designated judge should not be concerned with assessing the danger as his role was limited to identifying the conditions for the release and the amount of a surety.”

Take note: It is due process through the actions of Charkaoui in ongoing litigation that allowed the information fully damning him as a terrorist to now becoming public knowledge through docket.

Charkaoui had essentially impaled himself and immediately turned to trying to find a way to make such evidence inadmissible in court. Charkaoui argued that in reviewing the continued detention, a designated judge should not be concerned with assessing the degree of danger he may or may not present. He claimed that Judge Noels’ role was strictly limited to identifying the conditions for the release and the amount of a surety as granted under constitutional authority. Thus, the damaging information must be cast down and permanently inadmissible in Court.

Further, he attacked Noel on the grounds that the Justice had also done a ‘private review’ of all the ‘classified information’ upon which the security certificate had been originally based. This Charkaoui claimed placed the Judge in position of prejudicial bias necessitating removal of Noel and securing of information released as per his demands.

Charkaoui alleged that the disclosure of evidence on July 17, 2003 of Abou Zubaida, the close collaborator of Osama bin Laden, and that of Millennial Bomber Ahmed Ressam both having recognized him under the name of Zubeir Al-Maghrebi at the training camp in Afghanistan should have been disclosed to him at the hearing of the first review of the continued detention early in July 2003. Not to do so he claimed showed Noel as having apparent bias.

But the timing of ‘private review’ and disclosure of additional evidence on July 17 and August 14, 2003, was explicitly due to reasons of national securityThere was in no manner bias upon the part of Justice Noel in this matter. (FC 624 DES  303)

And, as the Justice states: “At the start of the matter, and as provided in the IRPA, I informed the parties that to properly understand the Ministers’ position (both with respect to the certificate and continuing the detention), I had reviewed the documents on which the certificate and the arrest warrant were based. I further informed them that I had held a hearing without the presence of Mr. Charkaoui and his counsel (decision of July 15, 2003, paragraph 7).

In reviewing a “matter”, a designated judge commonly undertakes an analysis of the facts which are important both for reviewing the certificate and continuing the detention. It is even conceivable that the evidence presented in reviewing the detention may be entered in the record of review of the reasonableness of the certificate.

Accordingly, it follows that review of the reasonableness of a certificate, determining whether a danger exists and monitoring the continued detention are separate functions which ultimately lead to different conclusions. It cannot be said that a determination regarding continuing detention necessarily leads to the same kind of determination regarding the reasonableness of the certificate.

However, I informed Mr. Charkaoui in the decision of July 15, 2003, at paragraphs 7 and 9, that the additional information could eventually be disclosed. In the decision of December 5, 2003, (Charkaoui, [2003] F.C. 1418, at paragraphs 15 to 19), I explained that the information he had been given could not have been disclosed earlier for reasons of national security. Mr. Charkaoui received the offer of a hearing to allow him to respond to this new disclosure before the six-month statutory review, but he declined it. I should like to emphasize that if this information could have been disclosed earlier, it would have been.

Take note: Charkaoui declined ‘the offer of a hearing to allow him to respond to this new disclosure before the six-month statutory review’. He effectively had some degree of timing the control of his attack upon the employment of the security certificate, but it was the entry in of the now allowable new evidence that panicked him to some degree. He had to try to negate the clear-cut evidence against him. He tried to get the evidence entry quashed under the guise that it was allowed in due to bias on the part of Noel.

Further, the Justice states: “At the second review of the continued detention, Mr. Charkaoui filed documentary evidence including newspaper articles commenting on the reliability and credibility of Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida (decision of February 4, 2004, at paragraphs 6, 9 and 12). According to Mr. Charkaoui’s arguments, the designated judge again demonstrated bias, or perceived bias, by failing to comment on the newspaper articles and their conclusions that Ahmed Ressam and Abou Zubaida were not reliable and credible.

Considering the additional evidence adduced on January 12, 2004, I am of the opinion that the danger must be assessed and that conditional release cannot be contemplated unless there is sufficient evidence that the danger is reduced or does not exist, and that Mr. Charkaoui will continue to submit to the proceeding.

It will be recalled that in Mr. Charkaoui’s opinion the facts mentioned above as a whole created an apprehension of bias or bias. As I have commented on each of these facts and concluded that they did not individually establish an apprehension of bias or bias, I can only say that these facts as a whole do not support a reasonable apprehension of bias or perceived bias.

Conclusions: (2004 FC 624 – DES-3-03)

“This decision comes down to the fact that Mr. Charkaoui’s arguments do not support the allegation that the designated judge should disqualify himself for an apprehension of bias, perceived bias or bias, for the following reasons:

– Parliament intended the designated judge to decide on the reasonableness of the certificate and the continuance of the detention;

– determination of the reasonableness of a certificate is not the same as determining danger and continued detention;

– the facts raised by Mr. Charkaoui concerning the proceedings and their continuance under the IRPA are not facts, as a whole or individually, that support a finding of perceived bias or of bias.

For these reasons:  The application by Mr. Charkaoui for disqualification is dismissed.”

Again, take note: Bias did not exist, the circumstance of additional information led to classified condemning information surrounding Charkaoui entering public docket and that former news paper reports not regarded as evidence are now qualified as being so.

Such media reports may entail events established through existing dockets or filed authorized government agency documents surrounding events having transpired. Both are considered legal evidence. But, media reports of themselves are not considered legal evidence. The media reports however, do point out apparent truths surrounding issues and the time lines of transmission of such events. In such light, both they and the reporters of such matters, are a necessary field that must be farmed by the parties held responsible for determining the pathways that national security must follow. The ability to plow such fields cannot be hindered by pandering or surrendering to the claim of rights violations of those parties deemed as needing to be needing investigation.

The Ressam Evidence damned the liar from inception.

We shall carry on in Series-10 with a few more of the Dockets surrounding Charkaoui precedent to his release on bail. These will point out even more salient facts stamping him as a sharia induced terrorist.

Adil Charkaoui remains nothing more than another Rabid Islamic Dog that needs removal from the Canadian landscape. 



Galatians 4:16    Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?




Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.