As was stated in Series-9 the Ressam Evidence damned Charkaoui as a liar from inception.

 We shall carry on with a few more of the Dockets surrounding Charkaoui precedent to his release on bail. These will point out even more salient facts stamping him as a sharia induced terrorist.

 As is shown in July of 2004: > Charkaoui lost another bid for bail.  (Justice Noel: 2004-07-23  FC 1031 DES-3-03)

Note: At this time a review of security certificates still has not taken place. The review was suspended so Charkaoui could make an application for protection. Here Charkaoui tries to introduce his potential torture as reason for removal of the Ressam Evidence.

He also tries again to say Noel is rigid and biased, making a ludicrous claim the Justice should be looking for means of reducing threats rather than evidence for establishing the level of threat. And, he still will not give an accounting for the original three concerns raised by both the Ministry and Justice Noel.

In this docket, we also encounter the ‘presence of another Islamic liar’, one Abdurahman Khadr.  This 22-year-old Canadian citizen testified about his life in Afghanistan.  From 1996 to 1999 in Jalalabad and then in Kabul until November 2001.

He was then under CIA detention until 2003, a period during which he had agreed to become an informer. In this capacity, he was sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for about eight months. Subsequently, after being trained in infiltration, he was sent to Bosnia where he remained for one month.

In December 2003, he had decided to return to Toronto, Ontario, Canada, a place where he had stayed several times in the 1980s and 1990s with his parents and brothers. In questioning by CSIS he stated that “in Afghanistan, the name of Zubeir Al-Maghrebi, like other names such as Abu Reda and Abu Hamza, were frequently used as a cover name and cannot serve as an indication of the true identity of the person who uses this name.”

Take note: This in no manner is indicative that Charkaoui was not employing such name; rather that he was using it, as Charkaoui has been established as knowing Zubaida in Canada.

Abdurahman Khadr stated he knew Mr. Zubaida and he described him as being one of the three leaders of the Khalden movement. He was the coordinator of the participants in the training camps. In this capacity, he coordinated their arrival in Pakistan, their conveyance to a “guest house” and to the camp and their return.

On cross-examination, Khadr admitted having lied to his family by hiding his role as an informant to the CIA. Also, he admitting having lied to his lawyer and to the people of Canada upon his arrival in Canada during his initial press conference in December 2003. He justified his subsequent decision to tell the truth by his desire to break with his past and begin a new life.

Take note: This supposed desire ‘to break with his past and begin a new life’ is the frequent Islamic ploy and a favorite of all lying Khadr’s such as Omar Khadr.

But, returning to Charkaoui we find it is the Ressam evidence that has him in a dither and him objecting to strongly. Adil was clearly and legally identified through docket information as being at the terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And no matter how many times or ways lying Islamists may try to alter this fact they simply cannot get around it.

Finally, through his counsel, Adil submits that the approach taken by the Court on the earlier reviews, that is, assessing the danger and then looking at the possibility of conditional release or bail, is not the right one. In his opinion, the Court should instead try to find the conditions that could secure a neutralization of danger. Say what? The possibility of conditional release or bail can only be considered through assessing the dangers poised by the release of the individual under consideration for such legal ruling.

As Noel states the Issue: “Taking into account the evidence presented by the Ministers associating dangerousness to national security and the safety of others with Mr. Charkaoui, should he be released on bail or subject to conditions in accordance with the evidence he has filed and the approach he suggests be taken?

I should add that these interviews were held in the presence of a lawyer who was representing him and that at two distinct points Mr. Ressam instantly and without hesitation identified Mr. Charkaoui on two different photographs under the name of Zubeir Al-Maghrebi.

 (29)  Exercising its general authority under section 78 of the IRPA, the Court had verified this statement and did so again using the best possible evidence given the special situation arising out of this case. The Court is satisfied that this evidence may form part of the record for what it represents.

It is inconceivable that the proposed supervision by his parents and/or sister and/or Mr. Ouazzani Larbi and the deposit of $50,000 in bail money could neutralize the danger as it is described in the evidence.”

Canadian Justice is not always blind to the truth, even though the process of Docket date renderings may create confusion as to ability to enter evidence at particular points in time or manners that are acceptable at the bar during a particular entry.

Whatever, Charkaoui was blocked from eliminating the damning Ressam evidence and such evidence had already become legally admissible in Court. The matter of timing of disclosure shows itself in the December 2003 docket where Charkaoui had > lost his bid to quash the case on constitutional grounds and his claimed  right o see secret spy service evidence .  (Justice Noel:  2003-12-05 FC 1418 DES-3-03)

“[17] In light of the preceding comments, it was not until July 17, 2003, that I was able to authorize the disclosure of certain previously protected information, namely, that Mr. Abou Zabaida, characterized as a close collaborator of Osama bin Laden, had recognized Mr. Charkaoui (under the name of Zubein Al Magherebi) in a photograph as being an individual whom he had seen in Afghanistan in 1993 and in 1997/1998.    

Take note: 1993 was Adil’s supposedly great religious study trip, where under pretext of travel for religious reasons he went to Morocco and where he met the French teacher, who became his wife. This docket, like others, clearly legally enters in evidence that damns Charkaoui for the terrorist he is. This is part of the evidence that he believes he has eluded through the bumbling’s of the Justices and timing of external events that released him through the Lame Bain Lamer decision.

[18] It was not until August 14, 2003, that I was able to authorize the disclosure of other previously protected information, namely, that in the course of interviews with representatives of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (hereinafter “the Service”), in January 2002, Mr. Ahmed Ressam recognized Mr. Charkaoui in two photographs and identified him under the name of Zubein Al Magherebi. Mr. Ressam added that he had met him in Afghanistan in the summer of 1998 while they were training in the same camp.

In September 1, 2004: Newspapers claimed Charkaoui > was granted the right to an amendment of a judge’s motion.  (Noel:  2004-09-21 FC 1291 DES-3-03) Read the dockets surrounding the matter as this is somewhat misleading.

Ultimately Charkaoui simply failed in a bid concerning the potential cross-examination of Ahmed “Millennium Bomber” Ressam and Guantanamo Bay detainee Abu Zubaydah. He desperately wanted a stay upon entry of evidence given by Ressam and Zubaydah. He tries to stall acceptance of the entered evidence through launching an appeal and claiming that unless he is granted a temporary stay he will suffer unjustified irreparable harm. For certain his life as an Islamic terrorist will suffer irreparable harm, but a blight upon Canadian society would be effectively legally removed.

In Sept 24, 2004: Charkaoui then > lost at the Federal Court of Appeal . (Justice J.A. Letourneau: 2004-09-24 FCA 319 A-603-03) The matter as raised was clearly answered:  Will the lack of a temporary stay during the appeal cause irreparable harm to the moving party?

“[12] On this point, the moving party basically cites three sources of harm that he describes as irreparable: his ongoing detention, the damage to his reputation resulting from a process which does not enable him to fully and effectively assert his grounds of defence and which appears to be institutionally biased, as well as the risk of his appeal becoming unnecessary.

[13] I immediately preclude the second source cited: even if it were a source of harm, it is not irreparable. Damage to reputation can be compensated monetarily. If the process followed by the Federal Court which led to the decision on the reasonableness of the certificate were to be quashed by our Court on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, I find it difficult to see how that decision could stand if its foundation were to crumble. Finally, in my view there is no evidence of an appearance of institutional bias at this stage, beyond the allegations to that effect.”

Then in October 2004 Charkaoui tries to get his certificate hearing dates changed under the guise of necessity of swapping of lawyers and funding for his defence now coming through legal aid.  > He tries raising constitutional questions and seeks a postponement through Justice Noel which is not granted.   (Noel: 2004-10-06  FC 1377 DES-3-03)

Then in December 10, 2004: Charkaoui > lost his appellate bid to have the security-certificate law declared unconstitutional.    (200412-10  FCA 421 A-603-03) National Security was the focal point of inquiry and Charkaoui was clearly established as the threat he truly poses and the fool he now publicly is stated to be.

(Reasons for Judgment:  Décary J.A. and Létourneau J.A.   Concurring Reasons:  Richard C.J.)

“The major question was: Do sections 77 and 78 of the IRPA contravene the rights under the Charter with respect to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, when, for example, the designated judge must determine the “reasonableness” of the security certificate issued by the ministers and not the merits of the case?

3] The appellant raised a plethora of constitutional questions before the designated judge: in fact, no fewer than forty questions.

4] As experience shows, one who seeks too much risks losing everything. The appellant’s position before the designated judge, who had to request some particulars concerning the constitutional questions, was characterized by virtuous statements of general, rather unfocused principles, often irrespective of the possible relationship to the facts of the case, and without any genuine effort to strike a balance between divergent individual and collective interests. While the appellant primarily criticizes the designated judge for focusing excessively on national security and thereby assigning undue weight to the interests of the collectivity, it is no exaggeration to say that the appellant’s position completely ignores the issue of national security. Thus, for example, the appellant claims, in the proceedings on the security certificate that was issued against him, a right of access to all the relevant information, including information that might be injurious to national security, and the right to be present and participate at all times in the hearings that concern him, even when evidence involving national security in regard to which he is considered a threat is being discussed. Hence his repeated constitutional attacks on a number of sections of the IRPA based on both national and international instruments protecting and promoting human rights.

[5] The appellant essentially repeated before us the arguments he raised before the designated judge, often making do in his memorandum of fact and law with a reference to his submissions to the designated judge.

[17] Because of the possibility of fluctuations in national security matters and the discovery of new information, the designated judge adopted a policy of ongoing disclosure of evidence and information to the appellant. That is why, on July 17, 2003, he allowed some information that until then had been protected to be given to the appellant. This information informed the appellant that Abou Zubaida, considered a close collaborator of Osama Bin Laden, had recognized him in a photograph and designated him as a person he had seen in Afghanistan in 1993 and in 1997-98.

[18] On August 14, 2003, further protected information was given to the appellant with the authorization of the designated judge. First of all, the photograph that Abou Zubaida had been shown for identification purposes was given to the appellant on July 17, 2003. Secondly, he was informed that Ahmed Ressam had also recognized him in two photos, adding that he had met him in Afghanistan in the summer of 1998 when the two were training in the same camp. Upon seeing the appellant’s photograph, Mr. Ressam identified the appellant under the name of Zubeir Al-Maghrebi, just as Abou Zubaida had done one month previously.

They are a reminder that in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can remove.

[68] This complaint of the appellant is in our view absolutely without merit, unfounded and consequently of no effect.


[144] The designated judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine the constitutional questions raised by the appellant within the context of the inadmissibility proceedings taken against him. But the appellant has been unable to demonstrate that the procedure for reviewing the reasonableness of the security certificate issued against him, and for reviewing the reasons for the continuing detention as well as the procedure for reviewing protected information under sections 76 et seq. of the IRPA, do not meet the requirements of the Charter and the three international instruments to which he referred. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the conclusions of the designated judge must be upheld and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.”

Then on February 1, 2005 Charkaoui > lost his bid to have the CSIS intelligence ‘summaries’ thrown out that were being used against him. (Noel:  2005-02-01 FC 149   DES-3-03)

“[2] Within the context of the fourth review of Mr. Charkaoui’s detention (see section 83(2) of the IRPA), he has filed a two-pronged motion: the first requesting that the certificate be vacated and that he be released, and the other, in the alternative, requesting that the summary of additional information, the new evidence dated January 6, 2005, be excluded.

CSIS: Adil Charkaoui was seen on 2002 01 31 and 2002 02 02. On the first contact, Charkaoui said he was prepared to clarify point by point what the Service might hold against him. He said he was prepared to undergo a polygraph, although he made fun of that tool. On the second contact, Charkaoui reverted to his defensive mode, saying he was being persecuted by the authorities, by the Service. Saying he has never done anything wrong, he refutes our allegations to the effect that some such as Ressam had recognized him. He says this time that he refuses to undergo a polygraph and storms out. Charkaoui left many points unsettled, for example: Charkaoui says he never went to Afghanistan, but he admits he went to Pakistan, without indicating what he was doing there. Failing any second thoughts and a change in attitude, Charkaoui did not leave us under the impression that he would see the Service again.

Counsel for Charkaoui adds that CSIS, as a government agency, is subject to the rules of natural justice and that consequently it must act with objectivity and in compliance with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter when conducting investigations.

The summary of the interviews of January and February 2002 should have been disclosed in May 2003. However, the error is human, and this explains the belatedness in communicating the summary of the interviews.

Furthermore, a careful reading of the evidence (both public and protected) indicates that the facts and allegations at the basis of the certificate and the detention do not originate in any way in the summaries of interviews but are instead elsewhere in the evidence. Of course, these summaries are part of the evidence but they are not necessary in order to demonstrate directly or indirectly the foundation of the facts and the allegations on which the proceeding is based.

In view of what is stated above, it is not necessary to address the other submissions, for there was no breach of procedural fairness as defined in section 7 of the Charter, the facts and allegations in the present proceeding not being based on these summaries. Nor, for the same reasons, is it necessary to discuss the role of CSIS in the investigation, other than to say that CSIS is not a police agency and that it is not its role to lay charges. As such, it cannot be subject to the same obligations as those attributed to a police force. Moreover, we are dealing here with immigration law, not the criminal law. The standpoint is different:

This procedure resulted in the production of a summary of the additional information. Briefly, the summary of the evidence discloses the following:

– the investigation concerning Mr. Charkaoui is ongoing;

– the Moroccan authorities have identified Mr. Charkaoui as being a member of the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) [Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group];

– the GICM is a group linked to Al-Qaida and is allegedly responsible for the attacks of May 16, 2003, in Casablanca and of March 11, 2004, in Madrid;

– during a trip to Afghanistan in early 1998, Mr. Charkaoui is alleged to have taken military training and theological training in the Sharia institute at Khalden;

– the emir of the GICM, Noureddine Nafia, who is being held in Morocco, reveals that Mr. Charkaoui was indoctrinated by a Libyan imam;

– some funds have allegedly been collected in order to establish cells in Canada, Pakistan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom;

– Mr. Charkaoui has maintained contact with and allegedly sent CAN$2,000.00 to the GICM and allegedly gave a laptop computer to a member of the GICM.

[28] Mr. Charkaoui, through his counsel, requests that the summary be excluded for the reasons cited in paragraph 4 herein.

Before commenting on the submissions by both parties, I should note that Parliament has anticipated the possibility that the Ministers might file with the Court new facts in support of the allegations (see section 78(e) of the IRPA). The English text is more explicit when it states: “On each request… made at any time during the proceedings…”. The latter clause does not appear in the French text. Accordingly, during the proceedings the Ministers inform the Court of new facts (favourable or unfavourable) arising out of the ongoing investigation.

Consequently, a summary of information may disclose some information in order to inform the individual of the circumstances giving rise to the passing on of information from the Ministers to the Court, but the summary must not be injurious to national security. This means, then, that the designated judge may be in possession of more information than the Ministers had at the time of the initial decision.

[42] For all of these reasons, the request for exclusion of the summary of additional information, dated January 6, 2005, is dismissed.”

Read the entirety of the docket for yourself. The case surrounding Charkaoui in his terrorist activities has been clearly established through the Series Dockets we have looked at. We shall be examining more further on, but what we have seen thus far will exemplify just how convoluted the legal mind may become in trying to enact justice.

In spite of all the entered in evidence as to the reality of Charkaoui we see it all tossed aside and the man released on bail through the docket rendered some 16 days after it was declared the CSIS summaries could not be dismissed.


On February 17, 2005 Charkaoui > was granted release from jail on strict surveillance conditions . (Noel: 2005-02-17 FC 248 DES-3-03)  

 You can wade through all the pages of testimony yourself, but the reason for the release ruling is quite simple. Charkaoui clued in somehow and played upon Justice Noel’s flaws like he was a cheap guitar. He broke his silence and “[12] for the first time, Mr. Charkaoui testified briefly through questions from his counsel and in response to questions in cross-examination by counsel for the Ministers. Mr. Charkaoui’s testimony resulted largely from answers to questions put by the Court.

Justice Noel may have believed that he was finally seeing compliance on the part of Charkaoui, but the docket evidence shows him lying and distorting events in his favor that Noel had clearly established prior as justifiable cause for considering him a danger to national security.

Charkaoui made all kinds of excuses for his past silence and claimed “he decided to testify to show his good faith.” He lied in matters surrounding his travels, such as when “Charkaoui said he had never been to Afghanistan.” He lied and downplayed his contacts with established Islamic radicals such as Samir Ezzine, Abu Zubadia, Karim Said Atmani, Abdallah Ouzghar, Raouf Hannachi, Samir Ait Mohammed and Abousfiane Abdelrazik.

When it comes to the garbage spewed by Charkaoui we are given a can full in relation to Ahmed Ressam and thus the mans ability to identify him in any manner. He goes to the extent of stating: “In the Montréal Muslim community, many people think Mr. Ressam was recruited by the secret services to embarrass Canada and that Mr. Ressam was never part of the Al-Qaeda network.”

He claims he never knew Ressam personally and yet the man Abdelrazik was the close personal friend of both Charkaoui and Ressam. Ressam knew Charkaoui and knew exactly who he was identifying when he placed Charkaoui in the Afghanistan terrorist training camps.

His glossed over comments of his personal life and the clown show ‘evidence’ of his John Galianos polygraph are just a waste of reading time. Neither has any useful solid basis of truth.

He gave a ludicrous opinion on terrorism.

“[19] Charkaoui opined at length about terrorism. He found it deplorable that a “terrorist” prototype had developed over the years, that of a young Arab Muslim male who traveled a lot and studied languages and the martial arts. He said he knew many innocent people who had been suspected of being terrorists, often on account of this prototype. He also told the Court that he found it difficult to understand how anyone “who was in a medieval country in a cave” (namely, Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan) could have perpetrated an attack on the scale of September 11, 2001 in the U.S.

Mr. Charkaoui noted that in December 2000 he was searched by the F.B.I. at JFK airport when he was accompanied by his pregnant wife, but nineteen young Arab men were able to board aircraft on September 11, 2001 without difficulty. He found it strange that the 19 passports of these men had been found but the black boxes of the four aircraft were still missing. From his reading, his study on the Internet and the newspapers, Mr. Charkaoui is not convinced that the attacks were committed by Muslims; he says it is equally likely they were carried out by neo-conservatives and religious authorities in the U.S.”

Note: When it comes to the parties’ arguments surrounding the docket information the claim that “Charkaoui perjured himself in his testimony” is absolute truth. And, the ongoing danger found to exist three times (see Charkaoui I, II and III) was and is still present today.

Whatever, Charkaoui knew the weakness Noel had was his misconstrued perception of Islam and the family and his counsel went for it: “[28] They added that the detention prevented Mr. Charkaoui from looking after his two young children and he was unable to earn any income to discharge his responsibilities as the father of a family.”

Further, his counsel played to the ego of Noel in giving illusion that he had finally won in bringing Charkaoui into submission to the law. “They mentioned that he had undertaken under oath to comply with “any conditions of release it shall please the Court to order”. This pleased Noel and when coupled with his personal beliefs thatpassage of timesomehow magically lessened his danger to national security or the safety of any person we hear the cell door slide open.

These factors are what effectively uncuffed Charkaoui and allowed Noel to mentally dance around the ‘damning entered in evidence’ and applicable laws surrounding standards of review that applied to arrest and detention under security certificates.

Noel drags on in his analysis and through personal emotional based flaws made void the reasonable grounds standard through his actions. He personally needs to be held accountable for the resultant damage to our society his actions have entailed. The docket evidence is clear and starting with Noel much of the legal system should be neutralized to prevent further damage to our Nation.

As Noel stated “[58] I do not intend to decide here on the reasonableness of the certificate, only to determine whether Mr. Charkaoui is still a danger and is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.”

Like, duh! A judgment that Charkaoui is no longer a danger is a judgment on the certificate retention of the man.

He goes on to state time itself “should neutralize what should be neutralized. I would even say that at the time of this assessment, the danger has been neutralized. [77] In summary, considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude on the basis of “reasonable grounds to believe” that the danger associated with Mr. Charkaoui has been neutralized.”

What a damning statement to proceed from your own mouth Mr. Noel. And, Noel, as you are well aware, all that has been written as taken from the Dockets can be entered at the bar. It shall prove very interesting with the blindfold taken off to see where the scales of Justice tip now, eh?


Charkaoui’s security certificate never has undergone a court review and thus has not been upheld nor has it been invalidated through any of the events that transpired. 

The case was suspended in March 2005, pending a new decision on his protection by the Minister of Immigration. It is in fact until today only in a state of suspension. Political expediency, the needs of protecting National Security and a couple process application fumbles cannot change the fact that security certificates are absolutely legal under Canadian law.

They were when Charkaoui temporarily slithered out of its containment and they are today if Trudeau and his cohorts have not yet instituted means to castrate them.

We shall return to The Sudden Songbird and Our Flaws of Noelsubsequent in further exposing Adil Charkaoui for the manipulating terrorist and liar that he is.



Galatians 4:16    Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?



Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.