As stated we are moving forward in further analysis and disclosure of more Adil Charkaoui chicanery. One way or another, as a Nation we have to deal with the abysmal reality of Islam and its adherents like Charkaoui.
The vomit of Charkaoui Stomach Turners was examined to some degree in what many have titled a supposedly landmark decision found in the docket > Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 SCC 9. This docket contains a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of procedures for determining the reasonableness of a security certificate and for reviewing detention under a certificate. We carry forward from here.
On February 23, 2007 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision of Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) on the appeals of Charkaoui, Hassan Almrei, and Mohamed Harkat. Within the Supreme Court Citation, you will once again see the claim that ‘passage of time’ and ‘disruption of contacts’ leads to serious decline of threat.
Neither premise is true when you come to dealing with Islam as 1400 years of recorded history proves that neither time nor disruptions leads to serious decline of threat. The aim of Islam never changes in its threatened domination of the world through sharia by any means necessary. The fuel of Islamic fired doctrine simply keeps the Muslim vultures in conspiring holding patterns until they can swoop in to tear the foul flesh of the infidel ridden Western Style democracies.
What Charkaoui, Almrei and Harkat had in common in their appeals was desire to foil the blockage of their attempted ‘sharia of Canada’ and concurrent employment of the legal system to garner them great cash settlements to carry them onward.
From the Docket we know the Court held that the security certificate process, which prohibited the named individual from examining evidence used to issue the certificate, violated the right to liberty and > habeas corpus under section 7, 9 and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Court however rejected the appellant arguments that the extension of detentions violated the right against > indefinite detention, that the differential treatment however violated > equality rights, and that the detention however violated the > rule of law.
As remedy, the Court declared the “judicial confirmation of certificates and review of detention” to be of no force and effect, striking down articles 33 and 77 to 85 of the > Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, but suspended the ruling for one year. Parliament was given the time to redraft the articles which were enacted through Bill C-3.
These are their legal Conclusions regarding the perceived troublesome articles:
 The scheme set up under Division 9 of Part 1 of the IRPA suffers from two defects that are inconsistent with the Charter.
 The first is that s. 78(g) allows for the use of evidence that is never disclosed to the named person without providing adequate measures to compensate for this non-disclosure and the constitutional problems it causes. It is clear from approaches adopted in other democracies, and in Canada itself in other security situations, that solutions can be devised that protect confidential security information and at the same time are less intrusive on the person’s rights. It follows that the IRPA’s procedure for the judicial confirmation of certificates and review of detention violates s. 7 of the Charter and has not been shown to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. I would declare the procedure to be inconsistent with the Charter, and hence of no force or effect.
 The second defect is found in s. 84(2) of the IRPA, which denies a prompt hearing to foreign nationals by imposing a 120-day embargo, after confirmation of the certificate, on applications for release. Counsel for the ministers submitted in oral argument that if this Court were to find that s. 84(2) violates the Charter, the appropriate remedy would be to strike s. 84(2) and read foreign nationals into s. 83. This is a good first step, but it does not provide a complete solution, since s. 83 deals with detention review only until the certificate has been determined to be reasonable, whereas s. 84(2) deals with detention review after it has been determined to be reasonable. Striking s. 84(2) would therefore leave no provision for review of detention of foreign nationals once the certificate has been deemed reasonable.
 Accordingly, I conclude that the appropriate remedy is to strike s. 84(2) as well as to read foreign nationals into s. 83 and to strike the words “until a determination is made under subsection 80(1)” from s. 83(2).”
Note: As was stated the Court suspended the ruling for one year to give Parliament the time to redraft the articles and get them enacted.
As partial solution to the security certificate system, in January 2008 the government created a special class of defence lawyers, who did not meet their clients, but instead argued for them in whatever secret hearings were held. > Special Advocate – Wikipedia The Government enacted this with Bill C-3 under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. This attempt to strike a balance between protecting the rights of persons named in a certificate and ensuring the confidentiality of information which, if disclosed, would be injurious to national security or endanger a person’s safety still left Charkaoui looking for means to abolish the certificates permanently. The ‘special class defence lawyers’ creation actually was troublesome to his attempted time stall through making application for protection.
The special advocates are appointed by the Court to protect the interests of persons named in security certificates during the hearings from which persons named in certificates and their own lawyers are excluded.
“The special advocate’s role is to protect a person’s interests in certain proceedings when evidence is heard in the absence of the public and of the person and their counsel. The special advocate may challenge the claim made by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to the confidentiality of evidence as well as the relevance, reliability, sufficiency and weight of the evidence and may make submissions, cross-examine witnesses and, with the judge’s authorization, exercise any other powers necessary to protect the person’s interests.”
The enactment was under > Bill C-3 (Historical) | openparliament.ca and received Royal Assent, thereby becoming law. In it you read “the enactment eliminates the suspension of consideration of the reasonableness of a security certificate that occurs when the person named in it makes an application for protection.”
In effect, Charkaoui could no longer block examination of the reasonableness of his security certificate, the results of which would have placed him back in cuffs and onward to deportation. So Charkaoui increased his efforts to attack through CSIS and keep awareness of his vulnerability on a legal back burner.
We must now return to the sequencing of events in 2007 that led up to this juncture in time.
In March 2007, the Supreme Court had agreed to hear a second challenge by Charkaoui, this time relating to the destruction of evidence in his case. Government lawyers had revealed that in January 2005 the CSIS had destroyed evidence in Charkaoui’s file. The situation raised some concerns about the accuracy of the secret evidence before the court. The Supreme Court set a date in January 2008 to hear the challenge.
In April 2007, the “millennium bomber” had responded through a letter to Montreal’s La Presse from his jail cell in the United States. Ressam was convicted in the United States and held under an unusual arrangement whereby he was offered a reduced sentence in exchange for information. Under this arrangement, over a period of some years, he fingered 130 people as “members” of the “extremist Islamist network linked to Bin Laden”. Ressam is believed to have suffered a mental breakdown while in prison. In a return letter to de Pierrebourg, written in Arabic, Ressam retracted all his allegations against Charkaoui. He said he was psychologically unbalanced when he was interrogated by Canadian security agents.
Trying to have his bail conditions quashed Charkaoui’s lawyers hoped that the letter would be enough to get the judge to lift the bail conditions he had been living under since February 2005.
Journal de Montreal’s Fabrice de Pierrebourg was subpoenaed to appear at the Federal Court hearing and on 22 August 2007 testified that in his correspondence to Ahmed Ressam, that the Millennium Bomber had withdrawn his allegations against Adil Charkaoui. Getting Ressam to enact such an obvious ploy to benefit Amnesty Internationals ‘poster boy’ was not that difficult for the Montreal terrorist links in and outside prisons internationally.
What was the finding specific to this Ressam recantation and other damning evidence against Charkaoui? Our poster boy got an all thumbs down for his duplicity as shown October 10, 2007 when he lost his attempt to have his surveillance regime quashed. > Charkaoui Re – (2007 FC / 1037 / 2007-10-10)
“Once again, Mr. Charkaoui believes that the time has come to cancel the preventive conditions attached to his release because they are not necessary to meet the objectives of the Act or the Court.
 Mr. Charkaoui is requesting that all these preventive conditions be abolished. During his testimony, Mr. Charkaoui offered his opinion, without specifically being asked, “that the preventive conditions as established would not have prevented him from committing a terrorist act.”
Abolishing the preventive conditions, as Mr. Charkaoui is asking the Court to do, would amount to a decision favorable to Mr. Charkaoui on the merits of the case, namely the reasonableness of the certificate. Charkaoui states the conditions are not necessary to meet the objectives of the Act or the Court. He claims new evidence contradicts the original evidence that was before the Ministers about Mr. Ahmed Ressam (who claims to have recognized Mr. Charkaoui in Afghanistan in 1998), Mr. Abu Zubaida (who also claims to have recognized Mr. Charkaoui) and Mr. Noureddine Nafia (who allegedly identified Mr. Charkaoui as an active member of the Groupe Islamiste Combattant Marocain (GICM)
 In this decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Court’s use of confidential information submitted by the Ministers that has not been disclosed to the named party (see paragraphs 49 and 61, Charkaoui VI). However, the Court declared that the security certificate procedure is of no force or effect because it does not include the participation of a third party (to be determined by Parliament) to verify the confidential information (see paragraphs 65, 70 …, Charkaoui VI). Having said that, the Court gave the government one year to remedy this deficiency and to propose amendments to Parliament that would be appropriate under the circumstances (see paragraph 140, Charkaoui VI). During this period, the IRPA and the security certificate procedure remain in effect. Paragraph 140 even indicates that if the Ministers want to go forward with the proceedings to determine the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui’s certificate, the IRPA would apply. However, the procedure for determining the reasonableness of the certificate under section 79 of the IRPA has been suspended since March 2005; the suspension will continue until a decision on the protection application is made and communicated or until Mr. Charkaoui requests that the suspension be lifted. At this time, it is impossible to proceed with reviewing the reasonableness of the certificate.
 In light of all Mr. Ressam’s evidence and only for the purposes of this motion, and given that the undersigned has not had the benefit of a hearing on the merits of this matter, I cannot conclude, based on the recent evidence, that Mr. Ressam lied when he said he recognized the person in the two photographs (Mr. Charkaoui) as Zubeir Al-Maghrebi and that he had received training in an Afghan camp in the early summer of 1998. In making this finding, I considered the evidence of the journalist Fabrice de Pierrebourg, the correspondence filed, the arrest warrant of the Service de police de la ville de Montréal and the testimony of the Forensic Identification Section etc…. I also took into account the testimony of Mr. A. Khadr. It should be noted that I had already stated that I was concerned about this aspect of the evidence and that I had explained that the interviews with Mr. Ressam had been conducted by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in January 2002 in the presence of a lawyer and that at two separate times, Mr. Ressam had identified Mr. Charkaoui in two different photographs immediately, without hesitation, as Zubair Al-Mogherebi. Considering all the elements associated with this evidence, I have concluded that Mr. Ressam was not lying.
 With respect to the evidence of Mr. Noureddine Nafia linking Mr. Charkaoui to the GICM and to a contribution of $2,000 and a laptop computer, the Court finds that this information from Morocco has been corroborated by “other sources”.
 Since Mr. Charkaoui’s release on preventive conditions, they have been revised several times to take into account the specific needs of Mr. Charkaoui and his family. These requests for adjustments have always met with a favorable response. Today, for the second time, he is seeking the complete and unequivocal abolition of all the conditions that were developed to ensure the neutralization of the danger associated with Mr. Charkaoui.
The Court is being asked to cancel all the conditions. This does not take into account the determination of the danger to be neutralized through the use of conditions. Such a solution is not proportional to the danger determination.
 Taking into account the danger with which Mr. Charkaoui was associated and the importance of ensuring that this danger is and remains neutralized, preventive conditions for his release are still necessary and, therefore, it is not in the interests of justice to cancel all the conditions of his release.
 Given my conclusion that conditions must remain to ensure that the danger is neutralized, I cannot simply order Mr. Charkaoui’s provisional release without any preventive conditions. The motion by Mr. Charkaoui for provisional release without conditions is dismissed.”
Thus, as well, in April 2007, Charkaoui submitted a leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in a third challenge; in this instance to the law permitting deportation of non-citizens when there is a risk of torture.
The Canadian government’s position was that legal safeguards against being sent to torture did not apply to people who were subject to a security certificate, basing this policy on their interpretation of a 2002 Supreme Court Suresh decision.
Charkaoui challenged this legal framework supposedly allowing deportation to torture and what appeared to be the lack of due process, claiming he was being unfairly treated through even being subjected to the threat of deportation to torture and procedural delays. He desperately wanted security certificates eradicated. Fortunately, he did not gain his desires, but events in February 2008 aided him in inching forward to his designs.
Note: Throughout his attempts to destroy security certificates Charkaoui challenged their legitimacy because he was not able to access the secret information in such files. Canadian authorities and the Federal Court had refused to disclose the case against him, relying on provisions in the security certificate process that permitted evidence to be kept from the defense and the public based upon reasons of National Security.
However, given the political needs of government individuals to separate themselves from the pressures associated with interrogation methods of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an opportunity was created that assisted Charkaoui. Some of the evidence on file was garnered from Abu Zubaydah, a “high-level” U.S. detainee being held in a CIA secret prison and now known to have been “water-boarded” to elicit his cooperation. It was the public-political pressure against the practice that had Canada’s top prosecutor assure defence lawyers the federal government would not rely on evidence of Zubaydah in their case. They did not do this because of the veracity of the evidence. As we have seen through our docket examinations CSIS had all the evidence on file establishing the case against Charkaoui. But this action created an environment that allowed Charkaoui to generate that all CSIS practices and all aspects of security certificates were suspect due to secrecy.
The actions surrounding this Abu Zubaydah incident truly proved to be a stomach-turning event for CSIS. Maneuverings through the political-justice system now enabled Charkoui to gain the Courts favorable decision that the CSIS should not be able to destroy notes and files creating their ‘summary files’, but agents should retain their notes and recordings.
This placed CSIS between ‘a rock and a hard place’ in their mandate to protect National Security. We shall show you why and their attempted solution when we carry on in Series – 13.
As shown prior through our docket examinations all the evidence is on file establishing the case against Charkaoui as a Muslim terrorist.
Prepare to rid the nation of him now.
It is a righteous action with God that you do so.
Galatians 4:16 Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?